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Charter Decisions in the McLachlin
Era: Consensus and Ideology at the
Supreme Court of Canada
Benjamin Alarie* and Andrew Green**

I. INTRODUCTION
Recent empirical studies of decisions by the Supreme Court of
Canada have found that the justices appear to lack the overtly ideological
voting patterns of justices on the United States Supreme Court.1
However, voting patterns may change both across areas of law and over
time. If justices do vote according to their own policy preferences or
ideology in at least some appeals, Charter2 appeals would seem to be a
fruitful area to search for such voting. Justices may vote in particular
ways for reasons other than ideology, including a desire to exhibit
consensus on an issue. A court may have different norms about
consensus and these norms may also vary according to areas of law and
across time. A norm of consensus in Charter appeals would, for example,
mitigate a desire on the part of justices to vote according to their
particular policy preferences. This article examines Charter judgments
issued by the Supreme Court of Canada from the beginning of Chief
Justice McLachlin‟s leadership of the Court in January 2000 to the end of

*

Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law and School of Public Policy and Governance,
University of Toronto.
1
See Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “The Reasonable Justice: An Empirical Analysis
of Frank Iacobucci‟s Career on the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 195; Benjamin
Alarie & Andrew Green, “Should They All Just Get Along? Judicial Ideology, Collegiality, and
Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 74 [hereinafter “Alarie &
Green, „Should They All Just Get Along?‟”]; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Policy Preference
Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1
[hereinafter “Alarie & Green, „Policy Preference Change‟”]; and Claire L. Ostberg & Matthew E.
Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision-Making in the Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 2007) [hereinafter “Ostberg & Wetstein”].
2
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
**
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March 2009. It seeks to identify the role of ideology and consensus in the
decisions of the Court and to discuss the implications.
The literature on ideological or attitudinal voting is particularly well
developed in studies of the U.S. Supreme Court.3 These and related
studies have found that American appellate justices, and particularly
those on the U.S. Supreme Court, tend to vote in particular ways that
seem to have a political valence. These studies generally group justices
by certain indicators of ideological preference such as the party of the
appointing president or how the justices were viewed ideologically at the
time of appointment. For example, justices appointed by Democratic
presidents tend to vote similarly to other justices nominated by Democratic
presidents and these justices generally vote in a more “liberal” manner
than Republican-nominated justices. These differences are most stark in
appeals involving civil rights and freedoms. Nevertheless, despite this
tendency to vote in accordance with policy preferences, the U.S.
Supreme Court renders unanimous decisions in approximately 40 per
cent of the appeals it hears.4
The Supreme Court of Canada has tended to exhibit a different
pattern. Although there is a connection between how justices vote and ex
ante indicators of policy preferences, such as the party of the appointing
Prime Minister or views of the justices in newspaper editorials at the
time of appointment, this connection is weaker than in the U.S.
Moreover, in Canada, this connection appears in the past to have been, if
anything, even weaker in Charter appeals than in other types of appeals.5
Further, there tends to be a greater norm of consensus on the Supreme
Court in Canada than in the U.S., with the Supreme Court of Canada
rendering unanimous decisions in about 60 per cent of the appeals it
hears; this is half again as frequently as at the U.S. Supreme Court,
which does so at a rate of about 40 per cent.
However, voting tendencies do appear to change over time. These
changes could be the result of a difference in the mix of appeals which
3
See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
Revisited (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) [hereinafter “Segal & Spaeth”]; Cass R.
Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa M. Ellman & Andres Sawicki, Are Judges Political? An Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006) [hereinafter
“Sunstein et al.”]; and Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, Theodore W. Ruger & Pauline T. Kim,
“Competing Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking” (2004) 2 Perspectives on
Politics 761 [hereinafter “Martin et al.”].
4
See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make (Washington, D.C.: CQ
Press, 1998), at 41 [hereinafter “Epstein & Knight”].
5
See Ostberg & Wetstein, supra, note 1; and Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change”,
supra, note 1.
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come before the Court — that is, the voting preferences of the justices
may remain the same over time but they may appear to vote in a more
“liberal” or “conservative” direction because the nature of the appeals
they hear has changed over time. Alternatively, the justices of the Court
may alter their voting behaviour as the composition of the Court and the
identity of colleagues change. For example, the substantive content of the
appeals may remain the same over time but the particular composition of
the Court may change as a justice leaves and another joins. The effect of
these leavers and joiners may be either direct, as where the addition of a
more conservative (liberal) justice changes the balance of voting on the
Court in a more conservative (liberal) direction, or more indirect, where
justices actually change their votes in the presence of justices more or
less aligned with their own views.6
In this article, we examine how justices on the Supreme Court of
Canada voted in Charter appeals between 2000 and 2009.7 We choose to
focus on Charter appeals as they have, at least in popular belief and
possibly too in theory (on account of the relative newness of the issues in
this area of the law),8 the potential to exhibit greater divergence in voting
by judicial policy preferences. We attempt to assess whether there has
been a tendency to ideological voting over this period. Moreover, this
period covers the leadership of Chief Justice McLachlin. If there is a
norm of consensus on a Court, it would seem likely that it at least in part
is determined by the Chief Justice. Confining the analysis to this period
therefore aids us in assessing the roles of ideology and consensus.
Part II of this article sets out the theoretical framework for the
analysis. It discusses the literature surrounding the voting behaviour of
justices, including the three most prevalent general models of judicial
decision-making: the attitudinal, strategic and legal models. It also
discusses the role consensus may play in judicial decisions. Part III
describes our data and the result of the analysis. It sets out the general
trends in the Court‟s Charter decisions in this period, including the
number of Charter appeals, the identity of the winning parties and the
degree of unanimity. It then analyzes how individual justices voted in
6
See Sunstein et al., supra, note 3, who discuss the role of panel composition on decisionmaking in U.S. federal appellate courts.
7
More specifically, our data includes 105 Charter appeals decided from January 2000 to
the end of March 2009. A full list of the appeals is set out in Appendix A.
8
See Peter McCormick, “Blocs, Swarms and Outliers: Conceptualizing Disagreement on
the Modern Supreme Court of Canada” (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall L.J. 99 [hereinafter “McCormick,
„Blocs‟”], discussing the impact of the Charter on levels of disagreement within the Court.

478

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d)

these appeals. Part IV ties the results of the analysis of Part III into the
more general discussion of how justices have voted on the Supreme
Court of Canada and the implications of these voting patterns.

II. WHY DO JUSTICES VOTE AS THEY DO?
1. Ideology and Cooperation
A considerable body of empirical literature has developed to try to
explain why justices vote as they do. Three principal models have been
developed, each admittedly insufficient on its own terms. First, the
attitudinal model assumes that justices vote in large part based on their
policy preferences. If, for example, a justice tends to have “liberal”
policy views, he or she may more readily find in favour of an outcome of
an appeal encompassing a more expansive view of equality rights.9
Second, the “strategic” model assumes that justices do not “sincerely” or
directly vote for their preferred policy outcome in each appeal, but
instead they take into account how their votes in the particular appeal
will affect and be affected by other factors such as other justices on the
court and other institutions, such as the legislature.10 Finally, the “legal”
model assumes that justices vote in accordance with legal principles and
norms of statutory interpretation and precedent. In the case of ambiguity,
justices attempt to interpret the statute in the manner most consistent
with the aims of the statute or law as a whole.
In this paper we examine two important dimensions of these models
for judicial decision-making. The first dimension relates to the degree to
which ideological views or policy preferences influence justices‟
decisions. This influence could arise consciously (where justices directly
consider and vote in accordance with their ideological views) or
unconsciously (where the views act indirectly on justices‟ votes, such as
through unconsidered assumptions).11 At one extreme of this dimension,
9

For a discussion of several models of judging, see Segal & Spaeth, supra, note 3.
See, e.g., Epstein & Knight, supra, note 4, arguing justices should be viewed as voting
strategically; Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau & Reginald S. Sheehan, Strategic Behaviour
and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005),
presenting a formal model of strategic decision-making by judges; Forrest Maltzman, James F.
Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the Supreme Court: The Collegial Game
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000) [hereinafter “Maltzman, Spriggs & Wahlbeck”];
and Segal & Spaeth, id.
11
See Eric A. Posner, “Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial
Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform” (Spring 2008) 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 853 [hereinafter
10
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the justices of a court would be described as being ideologically
“committed” or “interested”. At the other end of the spectrum, justices of
a court would be described as being ideologically “disinterested” or
“uncommitted”. Of course, it will sometimes and perhaps even usually
be that the justices of the court vary significantly in the strength and
nature of their ideological commitments.12
The second dimension along which courts vary is the collegiality or
cooperativeness of the decision-making process in which the justices
engage. Such cooperation is an element of the strategic model. At one
end of this dimension will be courts in which there is little or no giveand-take, where justices attempt to independently determine the appropriate
result in each appeal. These courts could be described as “uncooperative”,
with each justice providing, in some sense, an “independent draw” as to
the merits of the appeal. The term “uncooperative” is not necessarily
intended to be pejorative; some justices may consider and reasonably
value independence as the best means of ensuring sustained, internally
consistent reasoned judgment by each justice. This lack of cooperation
could be negative, on the other hand, if personal or ideological
differences limit effective cooperation. One would expect such a court to
regularly issue plurality opinions.
At the other end of this spectrum, courts could be described as being
“cooperative”. Justices on these courts may engage in more collegial,
deliberative decision-making. They may also value speaking when
possible in a united voice because, for example, they value clarifying the
law and consolidating the possibly differing approaches taken to discrete
legal issues by lower courts.13 There is also a possible negative side to
the “cooperative” end of the spectrum if the apparent agreement arises
not from deliberation but from justices trading off votes across appeals or
areas of law in a judicial version of legislative logrolling.

“Posner”], distinguishing between judges who allow their political biases to impact their decisions
and those who do not, as well as between explicit or implicit bias.
12
The discussion in this section is based on Alarie & Green, “Should They All Just Get
Along?”, supra, note 1.
13
Some courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, have a practice of from time to
time issuing per curiam judgments that are not identified as having been authored by any particular
justice. The Supreme Court of Canada has done this a number of times, including Quebec (Attorney
General) v. Blaikie (No. 1), [1981] S.C.J. No. 30, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.); Reference re
Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.); and Reference re SameSex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (S.C.C.). Since January 2000 the Supreme
Court of Canada has done this on nine occasions in Charter appeals; see Appendix A for a list of
these nine inter alia judgments.
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Figure 1: Quadrant Framework for Analyzing the
Decision-Making Processes of Multi-Member Courts

Recognizing that courts could vary along these two dimensions, the
degree of ideological commitment and the degree of cooperativeness,
suggests a four-quadrant framework for analyzing the decision-making
processes of multi-member courts or panels. Courts in quadrant one
are ideologically committed and uncooperative. Quadrant two courts are
ideologically uncommitted and uncooperative. Quadrant three courts are
ideologically committed and cooperative. Finally, quadrant four courts
are ideologically uncommitted and cooperative. The following descriptions
attempt to define the extremes in each quadrant (i.e., the corners),
although any particular court at any particular time almost certainly lies
inside these extremes.
(a) Quadrant One: Ideologically Committed and Uncooperative
This first quadrant is associated with the attitudinal model of judicial
decision-making, in which justices are assumed to decide appeals
principally in a way that satisfies their own policy preferences without
regard to the strategic possibilities that might arise by cooperating with
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other justices in the resolution of any given appeal.14 Courts situated in
quadrant one, that is, courts whose justices are ideologically committed
and uncooperative, will tend to issue a multiplicity of concurring
opinions with an overall higher rate of dissents than the courts in other
quadrants, all else the same. The number of opinions and the rate of
dissent will be higher because the lack of cooperation means that
individual justices will place little or no independent value on joining an
opinion authored by a colleague. A justice will sign on to another‟s
opinion only where she has a high degree of ideological consonance with
the other justice in the particular appeal. If there is disagreement, a
justice will prefer to author her own opinion rather than try, likely
fruitlessly, to persuade her colleague to modify the reasons given for a
certain outcome.15 There will also be a tendency towards a proliferation
of opinions in the presence of certain pre-existing ideological commitments.
Justices, or at least coalitions of ideologically similar justices, will less
frequently agree on the merits of a particular decision and the reasons
justifying that decision than in circumstances in which justices lack these
ideological commitments. This second reason relates to the stickiness of
justices to a certain position they have reached on an appeal and would
influence both the level of agreement and the predictability of groupings
of justices.
(b) Quadrant Two: Ideologically Uncommitted and Uncooperative
As with quadrant one, justices on quadrant two courts will place little
or no value on agreeing for agreement‟s sake, but each justice will
engage in a determined exercise to evaluate the appeal on its legal merits
rather than on the basis of personal policy preferences. The second
14
The attitudinal model of decision-making has for decades been popular among political
scientists and is probably the most well-known and most frequently deployed model in the political
science literature. See, the sources cited supra, note 3, as well as David W. Rohde & Harold J.
Spaeth, Supreme Court Decision-Making (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1976), at 134-57; Jeffrey
A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993); and Frank B. Cross, “Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case
of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance” (1997) 92 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 251, at 265-79.
15
This increase in the number of opinions holds all else constant such as, for example,
workload. Justices may consider whether the (ideological) benefits of writing a separate decision is
greater than the opportunity cost (due to the time cost of writing a decision), which may increase as
the workload increases. For example, for the implications of workload in the context of decisions of
Chief Justices of different courts, see Tracey George & Albert Yoon, “Chief Justices: The Limits of
Attitudinal Theory and the Possible Paradox of Managerial Judging” (2008) 61:1 Vand. L. Rev. 1, a
discussion of the impact of workload on judicial decision-making.
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quadrant is associated with what legal theorists might call legal
positivism and formalism — the idea that each appeal has a most valid or
most defensible legal outcome, and that an ideologically uncommitted
justice will strive to uncover the true legal merits of each appeal and
decide on that basis. Justices of a quadrant two court may regard
cooperation as suspicious, because it would suggest the possibility that a
justice is open to compromising his or her own view of the underlying
legal merits of an appeal in order to achieve some non-legal or policy
goal. On such courts, suspicion and distrust of cooperation would
influence the rate of dissenting or concurring opinions. However,
because the legal authorities relevant to each appeal would be common
to each justice, there would likely be less room for difference on
ideologically uncommitted and uncooperative courts (quadrant two) than
ideologically committed and uncooperative courts (quadrant one).16
Provided that the range of ideologies of justices on quadrant one courts is
broader than the likely range of ideologically uncommitted independent
opinions of legal merit, a quadrant two court will tend to exhibit higher
levels of agreement than quadrant one courts and less predictable
groupings of justices.
(c) Quadrant Three: Ideologically Committed and Cooperative
Quadrant three courts are ideologically committed and cooperative.
Its justices would be open to deciding appeals on the basis of policy
preferences and, like the legal realists, would probably question the
possibility of judging neutrally or objectively on the legal merits. Unlike
quadrant one, however, the justices of a quadrant three court would
selectively cooperate in order to achieve a better overall match between
their own personal policy preferences and the outcomes produced by the
court as a whole. Such cooperation could be attractive where justices
work to understand each other‟s ideological commitments and use these
understandings to produce well-reasoned and sharply divided opinions.17
Alternatively, such cooperation could result from a process that more
16
This will be the result so long as the variation in ideologically uncommitted assessment
of legal merits varies less than the range of ideological commitments on quadrant one courts. This
seems likely, though it will not necessarily be the appeal but would depend on the particular
appointments process used for a given court and the composition of the court‟s docket.
17
There is an argument to be made that such a court would appropriately belong in
quadrant one rather than quadrant three if the votes of the justices are not affected by deliberation,
only by the reasons given. Moreover, to the extent that the justices are willing to revisit their
judgments, such courts will resemble quadrant four courts.
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closely resembles the output of a legislature, where members are willing
to trade votes and engage in episodic logrolling in order to promote their
own individual agendas.18 A quadrant three court would tend to exhibit
more agreement and fewer concurring or dissenting opinions than a
quadrant one court. Whether a quadrant three court would exhibit more
or less consensus than a quadrant two court would probably depend on
the variety and intensity of the policy preferences of the justices, which
would influence the mix of sharply divided opinions versus logrolling
outcomes that would prevail.
(d) Quadrant Four: Ideologically Uncommitted and Cooperative
On an ideologically uncommitted and cooperative court, justices
would tend not to steadfastly adhere to certain positions without taking a
close look at the legal merits of the appeal and taking the existing law
seriously. Further, the cooperative aspect means that the justices would
be open to learning from and influencing each other in a good faith
attempt at understanding fully the legal merits of the appeal, and
collectively forging the reasoning that is most compelling. The consensus
and cooperation may also arise from an emphasis on the public good
function of decisions in the sense of more clearly settled law. Quadrant
four courts will therefore exhibit the highest levels of consensus of any
of the types of courts. Open judicial minds, abundant legal talent, mutual
respect, diverse personal experiences and backgrounds, and effective
communication would characterize an ideal quadrant four court.
2. Where Has the Supreme Court of Canada Been Located?
Both quantitative and qualitative analyses are necessary to determine
in which quadrant a particular court is located at any given time.
However, as the above descriptions illustrate there are some quantitative
characteristics of courts in the different quadrants. All else the same, the
lowest rates of observed consensus will be associated with quadrant one
courts and the highest rates of observed consensus will be associated
with quadrant four courts. Quadrant one and three courts may also have
18
This is consistent with the literature surrounding the “strategic” model of adjudication.
For treatments of the strategic model, see Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, “Order in the Courts: A
Neo-Institutional Approach to Judicial Consensus” (1989) 42 Western Political Quarterly 391;
Epstein & Knight, supra, note 4, at 1-18; Maltzman, Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra, note 10.
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more predictable groupings than either quadrant two or four courts. The
relative rates of consensus for quadrant two and quadrant three courts is
unclear, and would depend on such factors as the legal talent of the
justices in quadrant two (for example, greater legal ability may lead to
more consensus) and the range and intensity of policy preferences of
justices in quadrant three (for example, broader scope for logrolling may
lead to more observed consensus).19
Prior studies of the Supreme Court of Canada provide some evidence
as to the location of the Court in the past. Earlier work has found a weak
positive connection between how justices vote and indicators of
ideology. In other work we have analyzed the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada using Martin and Quinn‟s methodology, which they
developed and deployed in studying the U.S. Supreme Court.20 This
method provides estimated “ideal point distributions” for each justice in
all appeals in the post-Charter period. These ideal point distributions
represent the ideological predispositions of the justices; in essence, they
indicate which justices tend to vote in which direction. Our earlier
analysis shows that with the exception of L‟Heureux-Dubé J., the justices
seem to be closely clustered with each other, with considerable overlap
in the distributions of their ideal points. Justice L‟Heureux-Dubé‟s ideal
point was substantially to one side of those of other justices, with limited
overlap. Interestingly, the party of the appointing Prime Minister turned
out to be a poor predictor of where each justice‟s ideal point lay relative
to other justices. While there was some connection between the ideal
points and the party of the appointing Prime Minister, the Liberal and
Conservative appointees were closely clustered and somewhat mixed
together. The following figure presents the ideal points for Supreme
Court of Canada justices in the 2000-2001 Term. Moving from left to
right (and from more liberal to more conservative), the figure shows the
ideal point distributions for Major J., Arbour J., Iacobucci J., Binnie J.,
LeBel J., McLachlin C.J.C., Gonthier J., Bastarache J. and L‟HeureuxDubé J. Four of the justices, Arbour J., Binnie J., LeBel J. and
Bastarache J., were appointed by Liberal Prime Ministers. The five
remaining justices were appointed by Progressive Conservative Prime
Ministers. The results demonstrate not only how clustered our justices
19

It is theoretically possible that a quadrant three court could exhibit even more consensus
than a quadrant four court depending on the mix of policy preferences of the justices and by
relieving some constraints on the bargaining, for example, by allowing for side-payments rather than
in-kind, vote for vote trades.
20
Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change”, supra, note 1.
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are, with the obvious exception of L‟Heureux-Dubé J., but also how
ineffective the appointing Prime Minister‟s party is likely to be as a
proxy for the justice‟s policy preferences.
Figure 2: Supreme Court of Canada Ideal Point Distributions
2000-2001 Term

In our earlier work we also undertook a more “direct” method of
analyzing the connection between justices‟ votes and their ideology by
categorizing votes in particular areas of law as “liberal” and
“conservative”.21 A similar direct methodology has also found a
connection in the U.S. between a justice‟s votes and the party of the
appointing President, particularly in the area of civil rights and
liberties.22 Consistent with the results using the Martin and Quinn
method, we found a weak connection between the voting pattern of a
justice and the party of the Prime Minister who appointed the justice.

21

Id.
See Nancy C. Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter J. Wiedenbeck, “The Ideological Component
of Judging in the Taxation Context” (2007) Northwestern University School of Law, Public Law and
Legal Theory Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 07-14 [hereinafter “Staudt, Epstein &
Wiedenbeck”].
22
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These results are also consistent with other recent empirical studies of
the Supreme Court of Canada.23
In terms of levels of consensus, the Supreme Court of Canada
rendered unanimous decisions approximately 60 per cent of the time in
the period 1990-2000, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which rendered
unanimous judgments about 40 per cent of the time.24 This level of
agreement has varied over time, ranging from a high of approximately 87
per cent in 1980 to a low of approximately 47 per cent in 1990.25 This
higher rate of unanimity suggests that the Supreme Court of Canada is
more oriented towards consensus in decision-making, although it is also
consistent with other possible explanations, such as higher levels of
logrolling (i.e., only apparent, not real, consensus), dispositional similarities
among justices, and a less ideologically divisive docket (i.e., appeals that
are easier “on the merits”). One reason to suspect that the Supreme Court
of Canada may face a less ideologically divisive docket would be that in
certain criminal appeals, accused persons may appeal as of right.26
Another factor affecting the higher rate of unanimity on the Supreme
Court of Canada may be the Court‟s frequent practice of sitting in panel
sizes of seven or five instead of as a full panel of nine justices. The effect
of smaller panel sizes may be mitigated to some extent, however, by the
Court‟s tendency to assign fewer justices to appeals that are considered
to be less controversial or divisive. Most important Charter appeals, for
example, will be heard by all nine justices.
The Supreme Court of Canada has been weakly ideological and
relatively cooperative in the post-Charter period. It therefore may have
been in quadrant one or three, but given the observed voting patterns of
the justices, the Court as a whole could be in any one of the four
quadrants and different justices may individually tend towards different
quadrants. If the range of the justices‟ actual policy preferences happens
23

Ostberg & Wetstein, supra, note 1.
See, e.g., Peter McCormick, “„With Respect…‟ Levels of Disagreement on the Lamer
Court, 1990-2000” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 89, at 97. According to McCormick, of the 959 appeals
heard by the Lamer Court from 1990-2000, 58.4 per cent were decided unanimously. Some justices,
perhaps not surprisingly, tended to vote together with greater frequency than others. See Peter
McCormick, “Birds of a Feather: Alliances and Influences on the Lamer Court 1990-1997” (1998)
36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 339.
25
See McCormick, “Blocs”, supra, note 8, at 130.
26
Over the period beginning with the start of the 2000 Term to the end of the 2008 Term,
the Supreme Court of Canada heard on average 14.3 appeals per term as of right, comprising 21.6
per cent of the Court‟s docket. See Supreme Court of Canada, “Statistics 1998-2008” (March 5, 2009),
online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/stat/html/cat3-eng.asp> [hereinafter “Supreme Court of Canada
Statistics”].
24
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to be narrower than in the U.S., then the Canadian Court could be in
quadrant one.27 Given the “brokerage” model of politics in Canada in the
past and the lack of significant differences in policy preferences in most
areas across parties, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s,28 the appointees
to the Court may have been largely similar ideologically. The resulting
voting behaviour would appear to be convergent, with small differences
in voting patterns between justices appointed by Prime Ministers of each
party corresponding to the small differences in ideology between the
parties and appointees. Alternatively, the justices may be voting in
accordance with their policy preferences in a strategic way through
logrolling. That would place the Court in quadrant three.
There are also explanations for the Court being in either quadrant
two or four. The appointment process may have resulted in justices who
do not vote in any particular ideological pattern, but who deliberate
together to reach decisions. The resulting narrow distribution of voting
patterns would then reflect the outcome of deliberation rather than the
influence of initial policy preferences, placing the Court in quadrant four.
Alternatively, the Court could be in quadrant two, where the justices do
not vote according to personal policy preferences and do not cooperate,
so long as the justices tend to independently arrive at the same
conclusion. This result is possible but it seems more likely that the high
level of agreement on the Court in this period is not associated with
independent voting, but rather with cooperation.
It is therefore difficult from the general data to determine confidently
in which quadrant the Court has been located in the post-Charter period.
27
There is some evidence that the initial differences between justices (as opposed to
particular issues) do not vary significantly. Ostberg and Wetstein have ranked justices on a scale of
-2 (very conservative) to +2 (very liberal) based on an analysis of newspaper editorials on the
justices at the time of their appointment. Justices appointed by the Conservative Prime Ministers
have had mixed rankings, with four justices considered to be conservative or very conservative, five
considered liberal or moderately liberal, and one essentially neutral (Iacobucci J.). Those appointed
by Liberal Prime Ministers, on the other hand, were predominantly liberal, with nine justices
considered to be liberal or moderately liberal, one conservative (LeBel J.), and one neutral
(Deschamps J.). See Ostberg & Wetstein, supra, note 1, at 55. These scores, which were set for most
but not all of the justices in the period 1982 to 2004, are based on an analysis of editorials in nine
Canadian regional papers. The methodology was originally developed for the U.S. Supreme Court.
See Jeffrey Segal & Albert Cover, “Ideological Values and Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices”
(1989) 83 American Political Science Review 557. Interestingly, these assessments of personal
policy preferences do not appear to correspond in more than a weak way with the voting differences
of justices upon appointment. See Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change”, supra, note 1.
28
See, e.g., Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence Leduc & Jon H. Pammett, “Absent
Mandate: Canadian Electoral Politics in an Era of Restructuring” in Hugh G. Thorburn & Alan
Whitehorn, eds., Party Politics in Canada, 8th ed. (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2001) 398.
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However, the general analysis may mask a clearer story hiding in the
underlying data. In particular, in this article we focus on two factors
which may impact the analysis. First, the levels of consensus and
ideological voting may change over time. These changes may result
because of a change in the justices on the Court. Some justices may be
more or less ideological and cooperative than others, changing how the
Court as a whole behaves in any particular term. Moreover, the Chief
Justice may influence these factors.29 She may, for example, have
particular norms about the optimal degree of consensus on the Court,
may tend to set larger or smaller panels (thereby changing the likelihood
of consensus) or, more controversially, use her power to select panels to
influence voting on particular appeals.30 Second, particular types of
appeals may be particularly divisive along party lines in Canada. If so,
the ideological differences in particular types of appeals may be
concealed underneath a more general tendency to vote non-ideologically
and cooperatively.
To test whether these factors may lead to a different sense of the
Court‟s behaviour, in this paper we examine Charter appeals during the
McLachlin era. At first glance, Charter appeals would appear to provide
a basis for clear ideological differences which may show up in the
connection of voting to ex ante indicators of ideology, the groupings of
particular sets of justices and the levels of cooperation.31 Choosing the
decisions under a particular Chief Justice allows us to at least notionally
hold constant the influence of the Chief Justice in terms of norms of
consensus and panel size and selection, assuming that she has been
consistent in her approach to these issues over her tenure. The results of
our analysis are set out in Part III.

29
See McCormick, “Blocs”, supra, note 8, discussing levels of agreement and disagreement
on the Court from the Fauteux Court onwards.
30
See Benjamin Alarie, Andrew Green & Edward Iacobucci, “Is Bigger Always Better? On
Optimal Panel Size, with Evidence from the Supreme Court of Canada” (October 28, 2008)
University of Toronto Legal Studies Research Series No. 08-15, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1152322> [hereinafter “Alarie, Green & Iacobucci”].
31
See McCormick, supra, note 24, arguing that the Charter has led to increased
disagreement on the Court. See also F.L. Morton, Peter H. Russell & Michael J. Withey, “The
Supreme Court‟s First One Hundred Charter of Rights Decisions: A Statistical Analysis” (1992) 30
Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, finding that after initial levels of agreement, levels of disagreement rose quite
rapidly in Charter appeals.
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III. IDEOLOGY AND COOPERATION ON THE MCLACHLIN COURT
In order to examine the current trends in the Court concerning
ideology and cooperation, we analyzed all the judgments of the Supreme
Court of Canada coinciding with Chief Justice McLachlin‟s leadership.
The appeals we examined thus run from (in neutral citations) 2000 SCC
1 (judgment released January 13, 2000) to 2009 SCC 16 (judgment
released April 2, 2009).
Of the 689 judgments issued by the Court over this period, we
focused on appeals which featured a Charter claim. The 105 judgments
in which Charter claims were addressed were coded for a number of
basic characteristics including the sections of the Charter that were raised
by the claimant, whether the context for the claim was a criminal appeal
(or extradition), whether the judgment of the Court was unanimous, how
each justice voted, and whether the justice wrote reasons in the appeal.
We used two methods to analyze these 105 Charter judgments. The first
is a “direct method” in which we assign “conservative” and “liberal”
labels to the judgments of the Court and its justices. The second is an
“indirect” method popularized by political scientists Andrew Martin and
Kevin Quinn in the study of the judgments and the justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court, which uses a flexible Bayesian methodology to “backout” the implicit policy preferences of the justices. We deploy this
indirect method using the same 105 Charter decisions. The evidence
regarding ideology and cooperation using the direct method is discussed
first, followed by a discussion of the evidence as analyzed using the
indirect method.
1. The Direct Method
Using the direct method each judgment was assessed according to
whether the judgment was in favour of the Charter claimant or in favour
of the government. With one exception, a vote in favour of the claimant
in each Charter appeal was considered to be “liberal” and a vote in
favour of the government was considered “conservative”. The exception
was in appeals involving a business making a Charter claim where a vote
in favour of the claimant was considered to be conservative. This coding
is based on an approach in recent studies of judicial behaviour in the
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U.S.32 While there may be disagreements in the context of a particular
appeal about whether the coding is an accurate description of particular
appeals, the coding aids in determining whether the voting behaviour of
the justice accords with other indicators of ideology.33
The table below provides an overview of the Court‟s decisions in
Charter appeals in this period. Using our definition of liberal and
conservative decisions, the Court‟s liberal voting rate was 46.09 per cent
over the relevant period. One popular way to look for the role of
ideology on appellate courts is to examine voting differences according
to the party of the appointing Prime Minister, or President in the U.S.
context.34 Considering the universe of Charter appeals decided by the
Court, the justices appointed by Liberal Prime Ministers were more
likely to vote “liberally” than were their counterparts appointed by
Conservative Prime Ministers (46.82 per cent versus 44.94 per cent). The
margin, however, is not dramatic, and should be interpreted as relatively
weak evidence of ideological voting over the set of Charter appeals
considered as a whole.
Table 1: Rates of “Liberal” Voting and Rates of Unanimity
Across Charter Appeals
All Charter

Criminal

Equality

Non-Equality

Number of judgments,
2000-2009

105

57

25

80

Rate of “liberal” votes
in aggregate

46.09%

41.45%

50.00%

44.88%

“liberal” vote rate by
Liberal appointees

46.82%

42.57%

55.20%

44.25%

“liberal” vote rate by
Conservative appointees

44.94%

39.54%

41.98%

45.88%

Unanimity rate

58.10%

61.40%

48.00%

62.50%

32
See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra, note 3. For Canada, see Ostberg & Wetstein, supra, note
1, C. Neal Tate & Panu Sittiwong, “Decision-making in the Canadian Supreme Court: Extending the
Personal Attributes Model Across Nations” (1989) 51 Journal of Politics 900; and Donald Songer &
Susan Johnson, “Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court of Canada” (Paper presented at
the Midwest Political Science Association Meetings, 2002) [unpublished].
33
A list of the 105 Charter appeals and our coding of the judgment of the Court in each
appears in Appendix A.
34
See, e.g., Staudt, Epstein & Wiedenbeck, supra, note 22, at 3 and 5, describing a number
of methods for estimating political preferences of justices.
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The matters involved in Charter appeals arise in a wide variety of
contexts that do not necessarily raise the same or even closely related
issues. For that reason, we also examined two particular sub-categories
of Charter appeals: section 15 equality claims and Charter appeals that
involved criminal matters; there were a few appeals that raised both
which are counted in each group. There were 57 Charter appeals in this
period involving criminal charges or extradition,35 and 25 appeals
involving section 15 claims.
In the criminal appeals involving a Charter claim, the Court had a
significantly lower liberal voting percentage (41.45 per cent) than for all
Charter appeals (46.09 per cent) and exhibited a higher rate of unanimity
(61.40 per cent versus 58.10 per cent for all Charter appeals). These
differences may in part be because in certain criminal appeals (such as
where there is a dissent at the appellate court) the accused person may
appeal as of right.36 Such appeals are — at least on average, though of
course not necessarily and not in all appeals — likely to pose legal issues
that are somewhat less challenging and of somewhat less social
importance than appeals heard by the Court with leave.37 Considering the
criminal Charter appeals decided by the Court over this period, the
justices appointed by Liberal Prime Ministers were more likely to vote
“liberally” than were their counterparts appointed by Conservative Prime
Ministers (42.57 per cent versus 39.54 per cent). The margin, although
higher than for the universe of all Charter appeals decided by the Court
over the period, was again not dramatic, and should be interpreted also as
relatively weak evidence of ideological voting.
Equality claims under section 15 of the Charter were significantly
more divisive for the Court than the full set of Charter appeals and the
subset of criminal Charter appeals. The number of liberal votes in
equality appeals was precisely equal to the number of conservative votes
(103 “liberal” votes versus 103 “conservative” votes) overall, which is
more liberal than the Court‟s average over all the Charter appeals of
46.09 per cent. Justices appointed by Liberal Prime Ministers were
considerably more likely to vote liberally than were their counterparts
appointed by Conservative Prime Ministers in equality appeals (55.20
35
Included in this figure are a number of extradition appeals that might more appropriately
be classified as immigration matters; however, we think that because the extradition process at issue
typically involves criminal charges in another jurisdiction, they are appropriately classified as
criminal for our purposes.
36
See Supreme Court of Canada Statistics, supra, note 26.
37
See Alarie, Green & Iacobucci, supra, note 30.
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per cent versus 41.98 per cent). This margin, far higher than for the
universe of all Charter appeals and the subset of criminal Charter appeals
decided by the Court over the period, should be interpreted as relatively
strong evidence of ideological voting in the context of section 15
equality appeals. It is worth noting, however, that there were just 25
equality appeals decided by the Court over this period, which does
somewhat reduce the significance of this difference.
Interestingly, the difference in liberal voting rates between justices
appointed by Liberal Prime Ministers and those justices appointed by
Conservative Prime Ministers appears to be driven entirely by the
stronger proclivity among Liberal appointees to vote in a liberal way in
equality appeals. In the 80 non-equality Charter appeals decided by the
Court, Conservative appointees were actually slightly more likely to vote
in a liberal way than were the Liberal appointees (45.88 per cent versus
44.25 per cent). Thus, using the direct method there is relatively weak
evidence for ideological voting along the lines of the party of the
appointing Prime Minister, with the exception of equality appeals, where
it seems that there is considerably stronger evidence.
The following figure sets out the liberal voting percentages for each
justice, which may assist in revealing attitudes in different areas for
particular justices that are obscured by aggregating the results for justices
appointed by the same Prime Minister. For example, although both
Bastarache J. and Arbour J. were appointed by Prime Minister Jean
Chrétien, the two justices tended to vote at opposite ends of the spectrum
in Charter appeals.
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Table 2: Proportion of “Liberal” Voting, Charter Appeals
Supreme Court of Canada, 2000-2009

Other noteworthy evidence emerging from the direct method is that
although most justices are consistently liberal or conservative in both
criminal and equality appeals, this is not always the case. Indeed, at least
one justice, Major J., is liberal in criminal Charter appeals and
conservative in equality appeals, and two justices, L‟Heureux-Dubé J.
and Deschamps J., exhibit an opposite pattern of being relatively
conservative in criminal appeals and relatively liberal in equality appeals.
Thus, there is some evidence of individual policy preferences being
expressed by justices, even if the expression of policy preferences by
individual justices does not appear to reflect systematic differences by
the appointing Prime Minister outside of the equality context.
With respect to cooperation on the Court, there was a considerable
degree of unanimity in Charter appeals during this period, which is
consistent with the Court‟s practices in earlier periods. Significantly,
more than half, 58.10 per cent, of the Charter decisions were decided
unanimously, which is in line with the rates of unanimity prevailing
under Lamer C.J.C. in the 1990s. Looking across the decisions of
individual justices, there are differences in the willingness of different
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justices to sign onto unanimous judgments, but overall the levels of
unanimous decision-making is high, ranging from a low of 50 per cent
for Rothstein J. to a high of 66.67 per cent for Charron J.38 With respect
to siding with the majority of the other justices — something which an
individual justice can control (the presence of a dissenter can destroy the
prospect of a unanimous judgment), Charron J. stands out as a strong
cooperator, siding with the majority of the Court (i.e., not dissenting or
giving concurring reasons) in 97.2 per cent of the Charter appeals in
which she has participated. The least cooperative justice using this metric
is L‟Heureux-Dubé J., who sided with the majority at a rate of 72.7 per cent.
Table 3: Disposition of All Charter Appeals
Supreme Court of Canada, 2000-2009

38
These justices may be outliers because of their relatively short tenure on the Court. We
expect that their rates of participating in unanimous decisions will fall into line with the other
justices as they participate in more Charter appeals.
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As with the evidence on the role of ideology or policy preferences,
equality appeals had a different pattern in terms of cooperation than
Charter appeals more generally or appeals that raised both criminal and
Charter issues. The most cooperative justices in equality appeals appear
to be McLachlin C.J.C. and Rothstein J., Charron J., Iacobucci J. and
Fish J., who each sided with the majority, i.e., did not dissent or offer
concurring reasons, in more than 90 per cent of the equality appeals in
which they participated. This norm of cooperation, however, was not
shared by all the justices. For example, L‟Heureux-Dubé J. dissented in
50 per cent, four of eight, of the equality appeals in which she
participated during the tenure of McLachlin C.J.C. as Chief Justice, and
cooperated in just 37.5 per cent of the equality appeals over this period
(which is low even compared with her cooperation rate of 72.7 per cent
in all of her Charter appeals). Justice Arbour dissented in 25 per cent
(three of twelve) of the equality appeals she participated in deciding and
cooperated in just 58.3 per cent of the equality appeals in which she
participated, far below her overall cooperation rate in all Charter appeals
of 80.2 per cent.
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Table 4: Disposition of Equality Charter Appeals
Supreme Court of Canada, 2000-2009

Taken as a whole, the direct method of analyzing the 105 Charter
appeals decided since January 1, 2000 suggests that there has been a
relatively low level of ideological voting overall, and a relatively high
level of cooperation among the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada.
The one exception is in the context of equality appeals, where it appears
that the party of the appointing Prime Minister carries some information
about the policy preferences of the justices.
2. The Indirect Method
Because of the potential contestability of the liberal and conservative
coding of votes, we also analyzed the data using the method developed
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by Martin and Quinn (which we refer to as the indirect method).39 This
method provides an ideal point distribution for each justice in Charter
appeals in this period. These ideal point distributions are supposed to
represent the latent policy preference predispositions of the justices —
that is, they are expected to indicate which justices tend to vote in which
direction. The indirect method is based on the Bayesian estimation of a
one-dimensional item response theory model using a computationally
intensive Markov chain Monte Carlo process.40
A number of assumptions are made in setting up the model of
judicial decision-making that underlies the method. First, it is assumed
that the relevant attitudinal or policy space is one-dimensional — i.e., a
line or spectrum. Second, the model assumes implicitly that justices vote
in accordance with their simple preferences, in keeping with an
attitudinal model of decision-making.41 We do not model any strategic
interactions between the votes of different justices, and ignore any
potential “panel effects” that may arise from certain justices being
affected by the presence of other justices on the same panel.42 Thus, a
vote to affirm indicates that, given their ideal policy point, affirming
gives a particular justice more utility than reversing the appeal. In
addition, because of the small number of appeals (n=105), Bayesian
priors (“positive” or “negative”) were assigned to the justices with the
two highest and two lowest rates of finding in favour of Charter
claimants.

See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, “Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999” (2002) 10 Political Analysis 134;
Martin et al., supra, note 3; Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, “The Median
Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court” (2005) 83 N.C.L. Rev. 1275; and Andrew D. Martin & Kevin
M. Quinn, “Assessing Preference Change on the U.S. Supreme Court” (2007) 23 J.L. Econ. & Org.
303. Martin and Quinn maintain a website on which they report updated empirical findings as new
decisions are rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court. The website is accessible online:
<http://mqscores.wustl.edu/>.
40
See Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change”, supra, note 1, for a more detailed
discussion of the method and its implications in the Canadian context.
41
This assumption can be supported on the basis that given that the Martin-Quinn method
uses only non-unanimous appeals, these are appeals in which justices truly do have the discretion to
go either way in their disposition of the appeal.
42
This is an oversimplification. Research by Cass Sunstein in the United States has shown
that panel effects can be significant on Circuit Courts of Appeal: see Sunstein et al., supra, note 3.
39
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Figure 3: Estimated Ideal Point Distributions in All Charter Appeals
Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada, 2000-2009

Note: Judges are listed in the legend in left to right order, based on the mean of each
judge‟s ideal point distribution.

The results of the indirect method are similar to the analysis of the
liberal percentage voting records of the justices. The result of the indirect
method considering all the Charter appeals in the period is a weak
correlation between the party of the appointing Prime Minister and the
justices‟ mean ideal points, not unlike the result under the direct method.
For all Charter appeals, the average mean of the ideal point distributions
for Liberal appointees is +0.135 versus -0.439 for Conservative appointees,
resulting in a gap in the mean of the ideal point distributions of 0.574.
The results were similar for the difference between the average mean of
the ideal point distributions with only criminal Charter appeals considered,
with Liberal appointees having an average ideal point of 0.222 and
Conservatives of -0.281. Finally, the differences were again similar for
the average mean of the ideal point distributions of the justices in
equality appeals, with Liberal appointees having an average ideal point
of 0.308 and Conservative appointees of -0.281. These results appear to
support the idea that Conservative appointees tended to vote slightly

(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) CHARTER DECISIONS IN THE MCLACHLIN ERA

499

more conservatively than Liberal appointees overall. However, the
results are not as consistent with the findings of the direct method with
respect to the particularly divisive nature of the equality appeals.
It should be emphasized, however, that when all Charter appeals are
grouped together, the ideal point distributions of the justices may in some
appeals be misleading. This is particularly the case for those such as
Major J., who is liberal in criminal Charter appeals and conservative in
equality appeals, and L‟Heureux-Dubé J. and Deschamps J., who tend to
be conservative in criminal Charter appeals and liberal in equality
appeals. These peculiarities are illustrated by the following diagram,
which shows, for example, that even though McLachlin C.J.C. and Major
J. had a very similar ideal point distribution when all Charter appeals are
analyzed, their manner of reaching that estimated ideal point distribution
was very different, with Major J. being quite liberal in criminal Charter
appeals and quite conservative in equality appeals, whereas McLachlin
C.J.C. tended to be a consistent centrist.
Table 5: Estimated Mean Ideal Points, Charter Appeals
Supreme Court of Canada, 2000-2009
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The upshot of the part of the analysis involving the indirect method
is that the justices of the Court have a high degree of overlap in their
ideal point distributions when all Charter appeals are considered. This
overlap implies a relatively unpredictable pattern of which justices will
join a majority opinion or dissent. The indirect method tends to produce
results with more sharply defined distributions when, as at the U.S.
Supreme Court, there are fairly predictable ways in which panels will
split (if and when a panel splits). The relative lack of predictability in
Canada and the overlap in the ideal point distributions found using the
indirect method in turn suggests that the Court has been neither overly
ideological nor uncooperative in the post-2000 period under Chief
Justice McLachlin with respect to Charter decisions.

IV. WHICH QUADRANT BEST FITS THE SUPREME COURT
OF CANADA?
As noted previously, quantitative and qualitative analysis is
necessary to fully understand the decisions of the Court. The results of
the analysis in Part III provide some evidence of where the Court has
been located in a particular time period and in a particular area of law.
The Charter appeals in the McLachlin era do exhibit some distinct
patterns in terms of both ideology and cooperation. These patterns have
important implications for issues such as the appropriate appointments
process for the Court.
Before discussing the implications for the appointment process, it is
important to draw out some of the findings in terms of this framework.
The results of Part II show that generally there has been a very high rate
of cooperation for Charter appeals in this period. The rate of unanimity
for all Charter appeals was high. However, the high rate of unanimity
obscures significant differences across justices and areas of law. The one
notable exception was that in equality appeals justices tended towards
fewer unanimous decisions, but at the same time also tended to have
fewer dissents and a greater than average number of concurring
judgments. The implication of these results is that in general the Court in
Charter appeals has been slightly more cooperative than for all appeals it
decides, but for equality appeals the Court has tended to be less
cooperative.
In terms of ideology, there is a weak correlation between justices on
the McLachlin Court and indicators of ideology when all Charter appeals
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are considered together. This weak correlation also holds for criminal
Charter appeals and is similar to results for all appeals found in prior
empirical studies.43 However, once again equality appeals exhibit a
different pattern. The correlation between ideology and voting in equality
appeals in this period appears much greater than in either general Charter
appeals, criminal Charter appeals or in prior analysis of all appeals in the
post-Charter period. One telling indicator is that the liberal voting
percentage for Liberal appointees is 14 per cent higher than for
Conservative appointees in equality appeals in this period. Interestingly,
an earlier study by Ostberg and Wetstein had found ideology to be
insignificant in equality cases, although it also found a significant
difference in liberal voting rates. However, their study was over a
different time period and involved equality cases beyond those that
invoked section 15 of the Charter.44
The implication for the location of the Court over this period is that
if all Charter appeals are grouped together, the Court appears to be in a
similar position to an analysis of all appeals lumped together. The Court
appears to be weakly ideological and cooperative, although still slightly
further towards the cooperative end of the spectrum than for all appeals.
For criminal Charter appeals, the Court is pushed even further towards
the cooperative end. However, the results for all Charter appeals and for
criminal Charter appeals may be partially influenced by the criminal
appeals which came before the Court as of right. In these appeals either
an acquittal was overturned on appeal or the appellate court was split in
its decision. These appeals should, on average, tend to be easier on
average than other appeals and tend to be assigned smaller panels. These
factors should mean these appeals would tend to exhibit higher rates of
cooperation.45 Further, if we assume a higher than average rate of
dismissal for these appeals (because these appeals are guaranteed an
appeal where an acquittal is overturned, regardless of the merits of the
appeal) and these dismissals are coded as conservative, they will tend to
make both Liberal and Conservative appointees appear more
43
Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change”, supra, note 1. See also Ostberg &
Wetstein, supra, note 1, finding correlation between criminal appeals involving right to counsel or
search and seizure issues and ideology as measured by the party of the appointing Prime Minister to
be positive but insignificant, but finding a stronger and significant correlation with ideology as
measured by scores based on newspaper editorials at the time of the appointment of the particular
justice.
44
Ostberg & Wetstein, id. They include s. 15 cases as well as cases under provincial human
rights legislation.
45
See Alarie, Green & Iacobucci, supra, note 30.
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conservative, potentially disguising a difference in appeals where there is
an actual dispute. An indication that the appeals for which leave to
appeal was sought may in fact be quite divisive is that the rate of dissents
is high for all criminal Charter appeals despite the overall level of
unanimity expected for as of right appeals.
However, while there may not be an apparent difference in Charter
or criminal Charter appeals, there does appear to be a difference for
equality appeals in the McLachlin era. The Court in these appeals
appears to be less cooperative — that is, there is less unanimity — but at
the same time there is a high rate of concurrences. The high rate of
concurrences points to justices finding value in presenting their own
ideological views rather than in speaking in a single voice. Moreover,
there is a stronger connection between indicators of ideology and voting
in equality appeals. For example, there is a larger difference in the
average liberal voting percentages between Liberal and Conservative
appointees (an approximately 14 per cent difference for equality appeals
as opposed to about 5 per cent for criminal Charter appeals and 4 per
cent for all Charter appeals). The Court in equality appeals therefore may
be located more towards quadrant one — that is, less cooperation and
more ideology. The higher rate of agreement of the justices in the
majority of areas of law may dominate the differences in the divisive
areas when considering the Court‟s decisions quantitatively as a whole.
Quadrant three is also a possibility.46
However, there are some interesting features in the voting by
particular justices which point to individual justices being in different
quadrants. First, there are significant differences in how justices voted,
both in ideology and cooperation. For example, the spread between the
highest and lowest liberal voting percentages is 25.4 per cent for all
Charter appeals, 28.5 per cent for criminal Charter appeals, and 47.2 per
cent for equality appeals. In terms of cooperation, the rates of justices
signing onto either unanimous or majority judgments varies widely from
97.2 per cent to 72.7 per cent for all Charter appeals, 96 per cent to 69.2
per cent for criminal Charter appeals, and 100 per cent to 37.5 per cent
for equality appeals. These large differences indicate significant variance
in individual approaches to these issues which may mean that, at least at
the extremes, different justices will be in different quadrants — they may
conceive of the judicial role quite differently.
See Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change”, supra, note 1, discussing the
differences in preferences by parties in particular areas.
46
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Second, some justices shift their positions across areas of law
significantly. Justices Major and Charron provide interesting examples.
Justice Major changes from having the median liberal voting percentage
for criminal Charter appeals to having the lowest liberal percentage
voting rate for equality appeals. This shift can also be seen in the shift
from the right to the left of the distribution in terms of ideal policy
points. Justice Charron exhibits an opposite pattern. She had a low liberal
voting percentage relative to the Court for criminal Charter appeals, but
was at the Court‟s average for liberal voting in equality appeals. In terms
of mean ideal points, she moved from the left of the Court‟s average
mean ideal point for criminal Charter appeals to the right for equality
appeals. These differences make it difficult to pinpoint a particular
justice‟s attitude across all areas of law.
Third, the voting record of McLachlin C.J.C. raises interesting
questions about her role on the Court, both in terms of the voting by
other members and any norm of cooperation. In terms of voting, she is
quite clearly in the middle of the distribution. This middle position is
seen most starkly in the ideal point diagrams, where she rests squarely in
the middle. It can also be seen in the liberal voting percentage data as she
is essentially at the median for all Charter appeals, for criminal Charter
appeals and for equality appeals. She is also only slightly above the
average liberal voting percentage for all Charter appeals and slightly
below for criminal Charter appeals and equality appeals. In terms of
cooperation, she has very high (and well above average) rates of signing
onto majority or unanimous decisions in all three categories and belowaverage rates of concurrences and dissents.
Chief Justice McLachlin‟s voting patterns could indicate that she
fosters cooperation and brings other justices to a common position.47
This cooperative role would mean that her voting would appear at the
mean/median of the liberal voting rates and her ideal point would be at
the centre of the distribution. She may be able to achieve such
cooperation through deliberation and fostering a norm of consensus. She
may, on the other hand, at least partially be able to bring about such
convergence through her ability to select panel sizes and compositions. A
Chief Justice‟s power to select panels provides an opportunity to both
reduce panel sizes on certain appeals (which raises the likelihood of
agreement) and select compositions which are more likely to foster a
47

See McCormick, supra, note 24, arguing that the identity of the Chief Justice has
mattered over time to the level of disagreement on the Court.
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particular policy outcome. More empirical study is needed of the ability
of Chief Justices to select panel sizes and composition and its effect on
outcomes.48
What does all this mean for the evolution of the Supreme Court? It is
clear that the role of ideology and cooperation will vary by area of law.
While there may not be an obvious concern with the Court as it votes as
a whole, the identity of those on the Court and on particular appeals will
matter in some areas. This connection in turn makes the appointments
process matter. However, the key question is — matter in which
direction? Does this point in the direction of the need for a more neutral
appointments process? Eric Posner points out that to the extent that there
is a single correct answer to a particular issue, a more neutral process
with the aim of not having ideologically inclined justices may be
preferable.49 However, the risk with such a process is that it produces
“safe” appointments that do not bring a diversity of views to issues.50 A
diversity of views may be desirable if an issue does not admit of a single
correct answer and the difference across justices permits greater debate
and deliberation on the issues.51
Does this mean that we should want a more politicized appointments
process? Such a process, like that in the U.S., may allow more thorough
vetting of possible appointees and therefore a more informed choice.
Further, politicization may allow a greater connection between the views
of the appointees and the prevailing public opinion. To the extent there is
no single correct answer to particular issues, it is possible that some
greater connection to public opinion may be desirable.52 The difficulty is,
of course, that such vetting may lead to less predictable judgments and
potentially to greater tendency towards logrolling. Further, Posner argues
that there may be an insufficient pool of legally competent, ideologically
diverse justices. There would then be a trade-off between the benefits
from diversity and the loss of legal competence.53
The focus on Charter decisions has shown that the area of law
appears to matter to the issue of in which quadrant the Court is located.
While examinations of the general voting behaviour by the Court are
48

See Alarie, Green & Iacobucci, supra, note 30, for an initial discussion of panel sizes.
Posner, supra, note 11.
Peter Hogg, “Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein to the SCC” (2006) 44 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 527.
51
Posner, supra, note 11.
52
Id.
53
Id.
49
50
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necessary and interesting, there is more to be gleaned by breaking down
the voting into types of appeals. Yet in this analysis even the category of
Charter appeals proved to be too large. The real wedges in terms of
ideology and cooperation did not appear until equality appeals were
examined. The current appointment process may provide the Prime
Minister with the ability to appoint justices who, while on most issues
are rather neutral, steer the Court in a particular direction in a narrow
class of issues.
Moreover, the appointments will have different implications in
different areas. To the extent that justices are clustered in their views on
an issue, the addition of a justice, even extreme, to the left or right of that
cluster is likely to have little influence on the identity of the median voter
— that is, the voter whose vote is pivotal to gaining a majority. However,
on the more clearly divided issues, the influence of a more extreme
justice may be similar to that in the U.S. — the identity of the leavers
and joiners on the Court becomes important in a range of important
social issues.54 Replacing a left-leaning justice with a right-leaning
justice can make a considerable difference. It is the received wisdom in
the U.S. that Republican Presidents attempt to add justices to the right of
the median justice, and Democratic Presidents attempt to add justices to
the left of the median.55 The appointment of an ideological justice with
more extreme views could therefore lead to changes in particular areas of
law where there is a significant difference in ideological views. In
Canada, this difference could be hidden within the apparent more overall
agreement. If so, a Prime Minister may be able to change the voting in a
particular area, but this may not be reflected in the more global measures
of how justices vote. It may also have multiplying effects as the justices
have discretion to choose a large percentage of the appeals they hear and
54
This importance assumes that a justice‟s voting is stable or predictable over time or, at
very least, in the short run. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Valerie Hoekstra, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J.
Spaeth, “Do Political Preferences Change?: A Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices”
(1998) 60 Journal of Politics 801 [hereinafter “Epstein, Hoekstra, Segal & Spaeth”] and Lee Epstein,
Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, “Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court
Justices: Who, When and How Important?” (2007) 101 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1483. There has been no clear
pattern of change in voting patterns by justices over time on the Supreme Court of Canada. See
Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change”, supra, note 1. The implications of changes, however,
will depend on the initial starting points. Even if justices‟ votes may change in either direction (more
liberal or more conservative), if the change is relatively small it may not make a difference in the
ultimate outcome on a heavily split court if the change occurs in the justices at either extreme. It will
be the shifts in the justices towards the middle that will matter most.
55
For a discussion of appointments and changing attitudes, see Epstein, Hoekstra, Segal &
Spaeth, id.
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ideology has the potential to play a role in which appeals come before
the Court.
The power to appoint justices may therefore not appear on its face to
have produced swings in the Court or even an overtly politicized Court in
the post-Charter era. However, more work is needed on specific areas of
law to make that claim. It may be that appointing an ideologically
disinterested court is impossible, and that ideological interests will
merely depend on the composition of the appointing committee. It is
even arguable that it is not, as noted above, desirable to have an
ideologically disinterested Court (a catamaran is, after all, more stable
than a kayak). A more transparent process may, however, impose more
discipline on the ability of future Prime Ministers to use the appointments
power to steer the Court on particular issues, if not on all issues.
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Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward
Island

[2000] S.C.J. No. 17,
2000 SCC 1

liberal

Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration)

s. 15 Criminal By the
Court?
-

-

[2000] S.C.J. No. 29, conservative yes
2000 SCC 28

-

-

Lovelace v. Ontario

[2000] S.C.J. No. 36, conservative yes
2000 SCC 37

-

-

R. v. Morrisey

[2000] S.C.J. No. 39, conservative
2000 SCC 39

-

yes

-

Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human
Rights Commission)

[2000] S.C.J. No. 43, conservative
2000 SCC 44

-

-

-

R. v. Darrach

[2000] S.C.J. No. 46, conservative
2000 SCC 46

-

yes

-

Winnipeg Child and Family Services v.
W. (K.L.)

[2000] S.C.J. No. 48, conservative
2000 SCC 48

-

-

-

Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v.
Canada (Minister of Justice)

[2000] S.C.J. No. 66, conservative yes
2000 SCC 69

-

-

R. v. Latimer

[2001] S.C.J. No. 1, conservative
2001 SCC 1

-

yes

yes

R. v. Sharpe

[2001] S.C.J. No. 3, conservative
2001 SCC 2

-

yes

-

United States v. Burns

[2001] S.C.J. No. 8,
2001 SCC 7

-

yes

yes

U S A v. Kwok

[2001] S.C.J. No. 19, conservative
2001 SCC 18

-

yes

-

liberal

-
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U S A v. Cobb

[2001] S.C.J. No. 20,
2001 SCC 19

liberal

-

yes

-

U S A v. Tsioubris

[2001] S.C.J. No. 21,
2001 SCC 20

liberal

-

yes

-

U S A v. Shulman

[2001] S.C.J. No. 18,
2001 SCC 21

liberal

-

yes

-

R. v. Ruzic

[2001] S.C.J. No. 25,
2001 SCC 24

liberal

-

yes

-

R. v. Dutra

[2001] S.C.J. No. 30, conservative
2001 SCC 29

-

yes

-

R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd.

[2001] S.C.J. No. 68,
2001 SCC 70

-

yes

-

R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc.

[2001] S.C.J. No. 79, conservative
2001 SCC 81

-

-

-

R. v. Hynes

[2001] S.C.J. No. 80, conservative
2001 SCC 82

-

yes

-

R. v. Golden

[2001] S.C.J. No. 81,
2001 SCC 83

-

yes

-

Smith v. Canada (Attorney General)

[2001] S.C.J. No. 85, conservative
2001 SCC 88

-

-

yes

Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General)

[2001] S.C.J. No. 87,
2001 SCC 94

liberal

yes

-

-

Suresh v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration)

[2002] S.C.J. No. 3,
2002 SCC 1

liberal

-

-

yes

Ahani v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration)

[2002] S.C.J. No. 4, conservative
2002 SCC 2

-

-

yes

R.W.D.S.U. Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola
Canada

[2002] S.C.J. No. 7,
2002 SCC 8

-

-

-

R. v. Law

[2002] S.C.J. No. 10, conservative
2002 SCC 10

-

yes

-

Mackin v. New Brunswick; Rice v. New
Brunswick

[2002] S.C.J. No. 13,
2002 SCC 13

liberal

-

-

-

R. v. Guignard

[2002] S.C.J. No. 16,
2002 SCC 14

liberal

-

yes

-

Lavoie v. Canada

[2002] S.C.J. No. 24, conservative yes
2002 SCC 23

-

-

Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada
(Attorney General); R. v. Fink

[2002] S.C.J. No. 61,
2002 SCC 61

-

yes

-

R. v. Hall

[2002] S.C.J. No. 65, conservative
2002 SCC 64

-

yes

-

Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral
Officer)

[2002] S.C.J. No. 66,
2002 SCC 68

yes

-

-

Quebec (Attorney General) v. Laroche

[2002] S.C.J. No. 74, conservative
2002 SCC 72

-

yes

-

liberal

liberal

liberal

liberal

liberal

s. 15 Criminal By the
Court?
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R. v. Jarvis

[2002] S.C.J. No. 76, conservative
2002 SCC 73

-

yes

-

R. v. Ling

[2002] S.C.J. No. 75, conservative
2002 SCC 74

-

yes

-

Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General)

[2002] S.C.J. No. 73,
2002 SCC 75

-

-

-

Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v.
Walsh

[2002] S.C.J. No. 84, conservative yes
2002 SCC 83

-

-

Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General)

[2002] S.C.J. No. 85, conservative yes
2002 SCC 84

-

-

Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney
General)

[2003] S.C.J. No. 69,
2003 SCC 3

yes

-

-

R. v. A. (P.)

[2003] S.C.J. No. 19, conservative
2003 SCC 21

-

yes

-

R. v. Buhay

[2003] S.C.J. No. 30,
2003 SCC 30

liberal

-

yes

-

Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney
General)

[2003] S.C.J. No. 32,
2003 SCC 34

liberal

yes

-

-

Ell v. Alberta

[2003] S.C.J. No. 35, conservative
2003 SCC 35

-

-

-

Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General)

[2003] S.C.J. No. 37,
2003 SCC 37

liberal

-

-

-

Nova Scotia v. Martin; Nova Scotia v.
Laseur

[2003] S.C.J. No. 54,
2003 SCC 54

liberal

yes

-

-

R. v. B. (S.A.)

[2003] S.C.J. No. 61, conservative
2003 SCC 60

-

yes

-

Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia

[2003] S.C.J. No. 63,
2003 SCC 62

liberal

-

-

-

Vann Niagara Ltd. v. Oakville (Town)

[2003] S.C.J. No. 71,
2003 SCC 65

liberal

-

-

-

Maranda v. Richer

[2003] S.C.J. No. 69,
2003 SCC 67

liberal

-

yes

-

R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine

[2003] S.C.J. No. 79, conservative
2003 SCC 74

-

yes

-

R. v. Clay

[2003] S.C.J. No. 80, conservative
2003 SCC 75

-

yes

-

Canadian Foundation for Children,
Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney
General)

[2004] S.C.J. No. 6, conservative yes
2004 SCC 4

-

-

Harper v. Canada (Attorney General)

[2004] S.C.J. No. 28, conservative
2004 SCC 33

-

-

-

Application under s. 83.28 of the
Criminal Code (Re)

[2004] S.C.J. No. 40, conservative
2004 SCC 42

-

yes

-

liberal

liberal
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R. v. Demers

[2004] S.C.J. No. 43,
2004 SCC 46

liberal

yes

yes

-

Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem

[2004] S.C.J. No. 46,
2004 SCC 47

liberal

-

-

-

Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah
de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine
(Village)

[2004] S.C.J. No. 45,
2004 SCC 48

liberal

-

-

-

R. v. Mann

[2004] S.C.J. No. 49,
2004 SCC 52

liberal

-

yes

-

Hodge v. Canada

[2004] S.C.J. No. 60, conservative yes
2004 SCC 65

-

-

Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v.
N.A.P.E.

[2004] S.C.J. No. 61, conservative yes
2004 SCC 66

-

-

R. v. Tessling

[2004] S.C.J. No. 63, conservative
2004 SCC 67

yes

-

Auton v. British Columbia (Attorney
General)

[2004] S.C.J. No. 71, conservative yes
2004 SCC 78

-

-

Reference re Same-Sex Marriage

[2004] S.C.J. No. 75,
2004 SCC 79

yes

-

yes

Martineau v. Canada (Minister of
National Revenue)

[2004] S.C.J. No. 58, conservative
2004 SCC 81

-

-

-

R. v. Decorte

[2004] S.C.J. No. 77, conservative
2005 SCC 9

-

yes

-

UL Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney
General)

[2005] S.C.J. No. 11,
2005 SCC 10

liberal

-

-

-

Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney
General)

[2005] S.C.J. No. 14,
2005 SCC 14

liberal

-

-

yes

Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney
General)

[2005] S.C.J. No. 15, conservative yes
2005 SCC 15

-

yes

R. v. Chow

[2005] S.C.J. No. 22, conservative
2005 SCC 24

-

yes

-

Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General)

[2005] S.C.J. No. 33,
2005 SCC 35

-

-

-

R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias

[2005] S.C.J. No. 37, conservative
2005 SCC 37

-

yes

-

Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v.
Ontario

[2005] S.C.J. No. 41, conservative
2005 SCC 41

-

-

-

Medovarski v. Canada; Esteban v.
Canada

[2005] S.C.J. No. 31, conservative
2005 SCC 51

-

yes

-

Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec
Inc.

[2005] S.C.J. No. 63,
2005 SCC 62

-

yes

-

R. v. Pires; R. v. Lising

[2005] S.C.J. No. 67, conservative
2005 SCC 66

-

yes

-

liberal

liberal

liberal

s. 15 Criminal By the
Court?

-
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R. v. Henry

[2005] S.C.J. No. 76, conservative
2005 SCC 76

-

yes

-

R. v. Wiles

[2005] S.C.J. No. 53, conservative
2005 SCC 84

-

yes

-

Multani v. Commission scolaire
Marguerite-Bourgeoys

[2006] S.C.J. No. 6,
2006 SCC 6

liberal

yes

-

-

R. v. Chaisson

[2006] S.C.J. No. 11,
2006 SCC 11

liberal

-

yes

-

R. v. Rodgers

[2006] S.C.J. No. 15, conservative
2006 SCC 15

-

yes

-

U S A v. Ferras; U S A v. Latty

[2006] S.C.J. No. 33, conservative
2006 SCC 33

-

yes

-

United Mexican States v. Ortega; U S A
v. Fiessel

[2006] S.C.J. No. 34,
2006 SCC 34

liberal

-

yes

-

R. v. Krieger

[2006] S.C.J. No. 47,
2006 SCC 47

liberal

-

yes

-

Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration)

[2007] S.C.J. No. 9,
2007 SCC 9

liberal

yes

yes

-

Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop

[2007] S.C.J. No. 10,
2007 SCC 10

liberal

yes

-

-

R. v. Bryan

[2007] S.C.J. No. 12, conservative
2007 SCC 12

-

-

-

R. v. Hape

[2007] S.C.J. No. 26, conservative
2007 SCC 26

-

yes

-

Health Services and Support - Facilities
Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British
Columbia

[2007] S.C.J. No. 27,
2007 SCC 27

liberal

yes

-

-

Canada (Attorney General) v. JTIMacdonald Corp.

[2007] S.C.J. No. 30,
2007 SCC 30

liberal

-

-

-

Baier v. Alberta

[2007] S.C.J. No. 31, conservative yes
2007 SCC 31

-

-

R. v. Clayton

[2007] S.C.J. No. 32, conservative
2007 SCC 32

-

yes

-

R. v. Singh

[2007] S.C.J. No. 48, conservative
2007 SCC 48

-

yes

-

R. v. Ferguson

[2008] S.C.J. No. 6, conservative
2008 SCC 6

-

yes

-

Société des Acadiens et Acadiennes du
Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Canada

[2008] S.C.J. No. 15,
2008 SCC 15

liberal

-

-

-

R. v. Kang-Brown

[2008] S.C.J. No. 18,
2008 SCC 18

liberal

-

yes

-

R. v. M. (A.)

[2008] S.C.J. No. 19, conservative
2008 SCC 19

-

yes

-
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Lake v. Canada (Minister of Justice)

[2008] S.C.J. No. 23, conservative
2008 SCC 23

-

yes

-

R. v. B. (D.)

[2008] S.C.J. No. 25,
2008 SCC 25

liberal

-

yes

-

Canada (Justice) v. Khadr

[2008] S.C.J. No. 28,
2008 SCC 28

liberal

-

yes

yes

R. v. Wittwer

[2008] S.C.J. No. 33,
2008 SCC 33

liberal

-

yes

-

Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration)

[2008] S.C.J. No. 38,
2008 SCC 38

liberal

-

yes

-

R. v. Kapp

[2008] S.C.J. No. 42, conservative yes
2008 SCC 41

yes

-

Desrochers v. Canada (Industry)

[2009] S.C.J. No. 8, conservative
2009 SCC 8

-

-

Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v.
Canada

[2009] S.C.J. No. 9, conservative yes
2009 SCC 9

-

-

-

